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Abstract  
In recent decades, debate on the quality and safety of healthcare has been dominated by a 
measure and manage administrative rationality. More recently, this rationality has been 
overlayed by ideas from human factors, ergonomics and systems engineering.  Little critical 
attention has been given in the nursing literature to how risk of harm is understood and 
actioned, or how patients can be subjectified and marginalised through these discourses. The 
problem of assuring safety for particular patient groups, and the dominance of technical 
forms of rationality, has seen the word ‘unavoidable’ used in connection with  intractable 
forms of patient harm. Employing pressure injury policy as an exemplar, and critically 
reviewing notions of risk and unavoidable harm, we problematise the concept of unavoidable 
patient harm; highlighting how this dominant safety rationality risks perverse and taken-for-
granted assumptions about patients, care processes, and the nature of risk and harm. In this 
orthodoxy, those who specify or measure risk are positioned as having more insight into the 
nature of risk, compared to those who simply experience risk.  Driven almost exclusively as a 
technical and administrative pursuit, the patient safety agenda risks decentring the focus from 
patients and patient care. 
 
 
Introduction 
Globally, regulators, clinicians and consumers have expressed concern for the scale and 
scope of harm to patients arising from healthcare (Waterson 2014).  As a consequence, risk 
and risk management is a pervasive feature of administrative and professional discourses. In 
 these discourses attention is increasingly focused upon governing risk by monitoring 
breaches in safety systems and standardising clinical practice.  Incident reporting has become 
central in attempts to improve patient safety and volumes of data are collected, with root 
cause analyses undertaken.  As an example of the scale of reported patient safety incidents, 
since 2003 in the in the United Kingdom (UK), over ten million reports have been submitted 
to the National Health Service (NHS) National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) 
(Donaldson, Panesar, & Darzi, 2014).  Aligned with such reporting systems, a corpus of 
technologies (such as checklists, structured communication, scripted rounding and electronic 
alerts) have been implemented to govern risk of harm to patients. In healthcare, these safety 
and risk technologies are now deeply sedimented in managerial and professional discourses 
(Allen, Braithwaite, Sandall, & Waring, 2016).   
 
At the centre of this burgeoning “safety” activity in healthcare is a privileging of a type of 
technical rationality that has claimed epistemic and moral authority (Travaglia, Robertson, 
Davidson, & Daly, 2016).  This rationality assumes a linear cause and effect between human 
behaviours and latent system factors (Waring, 2009). In so doing, rationality fails to consider 
the often taken-for-granted meanings, underlying beliefs, and moral norms that constitute a 
culture of safe clinical practice.  It is essential that nurses critically consider the dominant 
technical rationality of risk management and patient safety, in particular, the propensity for 
assumptions that frame systems of care in terms of linear relationships, and therefore 
amenable to re-engineering.   
 
In what follows, we critically examine the concept of risk and unavoidable patient harm, how 
harm has been defined in healthcare, and by whom.  Employing pressure injury policy as an 
exemplar, the assumptions and exclusions of the dominant safety paradigm are foregrounded 
 and the concept of “unavoidable injury” is critically examined.  In focusing attention upon 
notions of unavoidable harm, our aim is drawn to the administrative and professional 
dynamics that have sustained a discourse that may be as much a part of the problem, as the 
solution.  In so doing, we highlight how the concept of unavoidability has become a linguistic 
device able to enhance the standing of various administrations whilst avoiding scrutiny of 
clinical and organisational practices. 
 
The evolution of modernist healthcare safety paradigms   
In the 1960’s administrative interest in safety focused attention to issues of clinical variation 
and clinician error, laying the foundation for a new orthodoxy on quality and safety (Waring, 
Allen, Braithwaite, & Sandall, 2016).  In this orthodoxy, risk and harm was framed as 
something to be measured and monitored through administrative systems, and then 
redesigned through the application of scientific knowledge (Donabedian, 1988; Leape & 
Reason, 2000a; Reason, 2000b).  Reflecting this tenet, at the forefront of contemporary 
international efforts to foster patient safety has been attention to human factors and designing 
out risk and error (Carayon, 2016; Vincent, 2012).   
 
In contrast to these recent developments, in the past, responsibility for patient wellbeing and 
risk minimisation was the realm of clinicians. Consideration of the nature and extent of 
patient harm was largely confined to professional discourses. Consequently, public and 
bureaucratic awareness or debate about the scope and scale of risk to patients was limited.  
As an example, Fear (2015) cites the professional containment of information on patient harm 
from anaesthesia.  In the 1950s concern was raised in medical journals that death rates from 
anaesthesia were ‘of sufficient magnitude to constitute a public health problem’, with the risk 
of harm greater than that of poliomyelitis epidemics (Beecher & Todd, 1954 , p32).  
 However, this issue was debated largely within the boundaries of professional discourses, and 
the extent of avoidable harm from anaesthesia had little public disclosure.  Over time, as 
safety problems have come to the forefront of administrative systems, patient safety has 
transitioned from the primary jurisdiction of clinicians. The emerging safety paradigm has 
positioned re-organising healthcare and re-designing clinicians’ work as central to assuring 
patient safety. This process has been largely driven and overseen by technical experts and 
administrators (Braithwaite, Sandall, & Waring, 2016).   Coupled with this shift, a rise in 
consumer participation and autonomy has seen consumers increasingly more active in 
decision making and in raising concerns about healthcare safety and quality (Hutchinson & 
Jackson, 2014).   
 
Another powerful development in the evolution of safety paradigms has been the 
development of technical systems to monitor and investigate errors. These systems open up 
for administrative and public scrutiny, matters that would have once remained within the 
jurisdiction of professional peer review processes (Iedema et al., 2006). The emergence of 
these administrative and technical safety paradigms has given rise to safety discourses that 
are deeply enmeshed in managing risk. These systems allow for organisational and public 
scrutiny of the dimensions and the nature of risk.  The dominance of administrative and 
technical safety paradigms in healthcare, has translated to moral imperatives and obligations 
that are not always aligned to that of nursing (Mercer and Flynn, 2017).   It has been argued 
that restructuring to promote safer systems of healthcare has become more about 
implementing austerity measures, than reducing the incidence of avoidable patient harm 
(Burke, Ng & Woplin, 2015).   
 
 Against this modernist and technical backdrop and operating at the intersection of policy and 
lived experience, nursing’s moral imperative remains to speak truth to power (Falk-Rafael 
2005).  It is crucial that the nursing profession continue to critique the effects of modernist 
and technical paradigms, and their impact on patients, nursing and nurses (Castledine, 2010). 
For nurses, this is important, not only because nurses are the largest sector in the healthcare 
system and plays a pivotal role in delivering patient care, but also because nursing is central 
to safe and effective care delivery (Burke et al., 2015).  It is particularly important that the 
pervasive language of safety and its potential to normalise certain forms of harm are 
foregrounded.  The emergences of discourses, technologies and strategic ambitions around 
safety provide powerful metaphors that convey meaning, and over time, have shaped 
knowledge, beliefs and the conduct of professions (Holmes, Murray, Perron & McCabe, 
2008).  In this context, the notion of unavoidable harm has emerged in safety and nursing 
discourses. The lexicon of unavoidability and the associated ideology warrants more critical 
attention.   
 
Safety discourses and the language of risk and unavoidable harm  
Making visible risks to patient safety requires an agreed language and definition of risk.  
Whereas mathematical notions of risk refer to the probability of an event taking place (Sobo, 
2005), and in research clinical significance is established on the basis of probability of harm 
or benefit (Cochrane, 2015), the Institute of Medicine defined healthcare associated risk in 
terms of preventable adverse events attributable to error (Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 
1999).   Highlighting the variability of how preventable patient safety incidents have been 
defined, Nabhan and colleagues (2012) noted that, in 127 manuscripts systematically 
reviewed, a total of 132 definitions of preventable harm were identified. The more common 
definitions of preventable incidents in this review were ”the presence of an identifiable 
 modifiable cause (58/132 definitions, 44%), reasonable adaptation to a process will prevent 
future recurrence (30/132, 23%)”; and ”adherence to guidelines (22/132, 16%)“  (Nabhan et 
al., 2012 p,128).  Hogan and colleagues applied an alternative metric, defining avoidable 
patient deaths as those where an expert panel established a 50% probability that the deaths 
were avoidable (Hogan et al., 2012).  Clearly, the emerging modernist discourse on patient 
safety is grounded in variable assumptions about preventability and error.  A fundamental 
premise is that patient safety incidents are avoidable when they have causes that can be 
modified to avoid future recurrence.   
 
Although widely espoused in policy and regulatory agendas, the goal of avoiding preventable 
harm is often framed as aspirational, rather than attainable. Pragmatic stances espouse that, in 
”such a risky and complex endeavour as healthcare, there will always be an element of 
avoidable harm” (Walsh, 2013 p, 40). Other claims of unavoidability arise from the economic 
cost benefit trade-offs” of doing business” (Donaldson, 2015 p,1).  With economic 
frameworks in the safety lexicon redefining risk reduction in terms of reducing risk to as little 
as is reasonably practicable. In this context, risk is tolerable if the cost of prevention exceeds 
the monetary benefit (Hopkins, 2015).  This concept of acceptable risk has seen the language 
of risk in clinical standards and guidelines evolve to include of notions of acceptable, 
unavoidable or tolerable t risk of harm to patients (Stavert-Dobson, 2016).  
 
Attempts to provide clarity on incidents that are deemed avoidable, and differentiate them 
from those considered unavoidable, has resulted in the emergence of the “never event” in 
healthcare lexicon (Mehtsun et al., 2013).  This label has been applied to a group of incidents 
that occur repeatedly and result in considerable patient morbidity and mortality; but are 
considered highly avoidable and should therefore, never occur. In the United States (US) 
 there are now 29 incidents considered never events. Whereas in the UK, the NHS specifies 25 
incidents as never events (NHS, 2012).  The range of incidents under the umbrella of never 
events includes more serious and less common events, such as leaving surgical instruments 
inside patients, or operating on the wrong anatomical site. In some jurisdictions, the more 
severe grades of pressure injury are also considered never events.  Reflecting the growing and 
increasingly polarised debate on never events, and increasing clinician disquiet on pressure to 
completely eliminate these incidents, the list of never events has been modified in some states 
of North America to differentiate never events that are usually preventable or able to be 
clearly identified and measured (Duchman et al., 2016).  Thus, an element of unavoidability 
has been introduced into the concept of never events.  As safety policies and paradigms have 
unfolded, attempts to avoid risk have become enmeshed in the complexities that it seeks to 
avoid.  The more risk has been framed as avoidable; the more attempts have been made to 
foreground unavoidable risks.  
 
Importantly, never events are not infrequent. Reflecting the scale of these events, 4000 
surgical never events were reported in 2013 in the US (AHRQ, 2015). In the US, growing 
concern for never events has resulted in removal of reimbursement by the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid for the costs of 11 hospital acquired never events (Attenello et al., 
2015).  Similarly in Australia, health care insurers have announced they will no longer 
reimburse for a number of preventable hospital acquired conditions (Jackson, Hutchinson, et 
al., 2016). It is anticipated that, over time, up to one quarter of hospitals will be subject to 
penalty for the occurrence of these events (Meddings, et al., 2015).  This change in policy has 
driven forward a growth in quality assurance activities, without any clear evidence emerging 
of reduced hospital-acquired harm for patients (Bae, 2017). 
  
 A critical lens on the concept of unavoidable harm  
A repeating thread in the literature on incident mitigation in healthcare is that, whilst aiming 
for zero harm is widely supported, some level of patient harm is unavoidable. In the nursing 
literature little consideration has been given to the forms of technical rationality and moral 
enterprises that mandate a focus on safety, while at the same time, tolerating harm to some 
patients by positioning certain adverse events as unavoidable.  In what follows, the notion of 
unavoidable harm is critically reviewed, with unavoidable pressure injury employed as an 
illustrative exemplar. 
 
The notion of unavoidable pressure injury  
The notion that some pressure injuries are unavoidable has been given growing prominence 
in the nursing lexicon. Guidelines on what are considered preventable pressure injury provide 
a broad interpretation of the unavoidability of these injuries (Jackson, Hutchinson et al., 
2016). One expert position statement identifies that these injuries occur in the absence of 
assessment or intervention (NHS, 2015). Whilst another expert consensus view is that, 
unavoidable pressure injuries are those that occur in situations where the patient’s clinical 
condition is such that pressure cannot be relieved or sufficient perfusion cannot be attained to 
prevent tissue injury (Black et al., 2015). Highlighting the variability of interpretations of 
unavoidable pressure injury, in one study in the US, it was identified that around 40% of 
pressure injuries were deemed unavoidable (Levine and Zulkowski, 2015). This is contrasted 
with reports from NHS Trusts, which suggest that 57% - 66% of pressure injuries were 
unavoidable (Downie et al. 2013; Downie et al. 2014). Further evidencing notions of 
unavoidable injury, a measurement instrument has been developed and tested for identifying 
unavoidable hospital acquired pressure injury (Pittman et al. 2016).  
 
 Whilst pressure injuries among particular patients groups are increasingly being defined as 
unavoidable, there is also considerable opinion regarding the reporting of pressure injury. In 
the NHS, the majority of institutions report category 3 and 4 pressure injury as serious 
incidents requiring investigation (SIRI) (Coleman et al. 2016).  Nonetheless, expert opinion 
has contested whether all category 3 and 4 pressure injury should be reported as serious 
incidents, contending that the burden of investigation may be too onerous and offer little 
organisational or clinical benefit (TVS no date).  This position contrasts sharply with the 
position in the US of Medicare and Medicaid, which has not reimbursed hospitals since 2008 
for hospital-acquired stage 3 and 4 pressure injury. In the US funders have taken the view 
that these pressure injuries are predictable and are reasonably able to be prevented (Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2007). It is clear that the notion of unavoidable pressure 
injury is widely held, yet also contested.   There is little evidence that patients and clinicians 
agree on what constitutes preventable harm, or whether providers and institutions should be 
accountable for harms framed as unavoidable (Jackson, Wilson, and Hutchinson 2016). 
 
The informal discourse of unavoidable as unreported incidents  
After decades of effort to mitigate patient risk, even in environments where there are well 
established incident reporting systems, most incidents continue to go unreported (Donaldson 
et al., 2014). In the UK, incidents deemed to have no, low, or moderate harm to patients are 
voluntarily reported, with reporting of patient deaths due to incidents only mandated since 
2010 (Donaldson et al., 2014). The limited nature of incident reporting was highlighted in an 
investigation into the association between incident reports and events recorded in medical 
records. This study reported that only 3.6% of adverse events were captured through formal 
incident systems (Christiaans et al., 2011). Globally, it has been suggested that somewhere in 
the order of up to 96% of patient safety incidents go unreported (Michel, 2003). This 
 discretionary reporting of incidents risks perpetuating informally invoked thresholds and 
interpretations of what is deemed an unavoidable incident. 
Highlighting continued under reporting of pressure injury, a recent stratified random sample 
of patients from NHS Trusts (n=2239) reported high levels of under reporting of pressure 
injury in incident report systems (Smith et al., 2016).  In this study, 34% of the sample 
identified in the audit to have a PI were not captured in formal reporting systems. This 
discourse is further evidenced in reports clinicians fail to listen to the concerns of patients 
about risk of harm from pressure injury (Nixon et al., 2015). In stark contrast to the discourse, 
which minimises harm from lower grade pressure injury, pain at the pressure area site is 
experienced prior to the occurrence of category 1 and 2 injury (Nixon et al., 2015), with this 
pain reported as independently predictive for the development of severe categories of injury 
(Nixon et al. Thus, whilst clinicians normalise lower grade pressure injury as insignificant, 
for patients, these injuries are highly significant, painful and predictive of further harm. 
 
Importantly, evidence confirms that patients are able to accurately identify adverse events at 
similar rates to those reported from studies employing expert panel review of medical records 
(Vincent & Davis 2012).  Despite this accuracy in identifying adverse events and the 
presence of  “open disclosure” policies, patients harmed or placed at risk of harm report  
clinician withdrawal and a “wall of silence” when concerns are raised (Braithwaite et al., 
2016, p 7). There are repeated reports that clinicians are not receptive to active patient 
involvement, and patients are actively discouraged from raising concern (Bismark et al. 2006; 
Harrison et al. 2016).  In the same vein, public inquiries into large scale failures in healthcare 
have repeatedly identified how patient and carer concerns are silenced or marginalised 
(Francis, 2013; Walsh, 2013).  
 
 The invisibility of the patient perspective  
A number of consumer groups and the World Health Organisation (WHO) patient safety 
program have highlighted the role of patients in improving safety.  Importantly, research has 
identified that patients do not see risks in the same way as clinicians (Christiaans-Dingelhoff 
et al. 2011; Kaboli et al. 2010).  Highlighting the significance of involving patients in 
defining harm, a study investigating harm from the perspective of patients and their surrogate 
decision makers, revealed that patient definitions of avoidable harm differed from 
conventionally defined medical error (Fisher, Ahmad, Jackson and Mazor 2016). In this 
study, participants identified avoidable harms that were unlikely to be acknowledged, or be 
the main concern for nurses.  Similarly, others have reported patients do not feel unsafe only 
in the face of errors, but also when they perceive service quality is poor or staff are 
unresponsive to their needs (Kenward, Whiffin and Spalek, 2017).  It is not known whether 
patients are concerned with the same risks that are the focus of risk management programs 
and administrative priorities (Sobo, 2005). In the safety orthodoxy, those who specify or 
measure risk are positioned as having more insight into the nature of risk, compared to those 
who simply experience risk 
 
The marginalisation and exclusion of patient perspective in risk prevention discourses, is 
argued to lead to a tolerance of lower standards or expectations for particular groups, such as 
older people at risk of pressure injury, people with learning disabilities (Tregelles, 2014) and 
those experiencing debilitating side effects from psychiatric medications (Wand, 2013).  
Foregrounding the notion of unavoidable risk of harm in nursing practice, Saiani et al (2008) 
reported that nurses perceived factors such as multiple disease interactions, refusal of care 
and limited monitoring of care provided in the community for older people with multiple long 
term health problems as unavoidable. 
  
Employing pressure injury prevention as an exemplar, the patient perspective is largely 
invisible from policy formulation, theoretical models and research on prevention.  
Highlighting this absence, a number of systematic reviews fail to identify patient involvement 
as a key component of prevention (Gorecki et al. 2009; Gorecki et al. 2014; Sullivan and 
Schoelles 2013).  Similarly, theoretical models of pressure injury development acknowledge 
patients only in terms of physiological and biomechanical susceptibility or risk (Coleman et 
al. 2013; García‐Fernández et al. 2014). In addition, quality improvement standards do not 
include domains relating to patient involvement or patient perspectives on pressure injury 
prevention (Padula et al. 2014). One domain in a pressure injury quality of life framework 
includes participation, but participation is defined in terms of social isolation, rather than 
active involvement in prevention or management of pressure injury (Gorecki et al. 2013). 
Moreover, when expert consensus has been employed to derive standards and theoretical 
frameworks, patients are not included in the panel as experts (Coleman et al. 2013; García‐
Fernández et al. 2014).  
 
The invisibility of “problems of care” in safety discourses 
Two of the biggest themes of the Mid Staffordshire inquiry were the need for more 
transparency and to give patients more voice (Walsh, 2013).  In the wake of this event, 
concern has been raised that adverse event and patient incident reporting systems focus upon 
technical and biomedical failures (Jackson et al., 2016).  These systems overlook failures in 
fundamental aspects of care processes - such as missed nursing care.  Internationally, there is 
considerable evidence regarding the extent of missed or rationed nursing care (Jones, 
Hamilton, and Murry 2015; Papastavrou, Andreou, and Efstathiou 2014). Yet, the risk of 
missed nursing care remains largely unacknowledged in the orthodox safety discourses.  
 Even though failure to provide nursing care may lead to harm, or contribute to adverse 
events, the notion that risk of harm does not extend to incidents such as failing to provide 
hygiene, nutrition or hydration, renders these care omissions and invisible or insignificant 
within extant safety discourses.   
 
Analysis of mortality and morbidity data from the UK NHS provides further insight into how 
“problems in care” can be informally framed as unavoidable.  In one large scale investigation 
into mortality data, attention was drawn to widespread care failures.  However, these failures 
in the delivery of fundamental nursing care went largely unreported, or were reported, but the 
scale and significance of the failures was not acknowledged (Francis, 2013; Walsh, 2013).  
This suggests that the positioning of “problems of care” as insignificant or marginal in safety 
discourses places patients at risk of significant harm.  
 
Risk tolerance in marginalised patient groups  
The stark reality is that perceptions of (un)avoidability can limit scrutiny of incidents. There 
is evidence that harm to patients can be construed differently in different care environments. 
For people with disability, incidents leading to avoidable harm are not well recognised, with 
failure to provide care leading to harm poorly identified for this group of patients (Levine & 
Zulkowski, 2015).  Patients who are not readily able to verbalise risks, such as those with 
aphasia, are more likely not to have adverse events documented despite being at increased 
risk (Hemsley, Wernick & Worrall, 2013).  Moreover, in environments where providers are 
penalised for hospital acquired conditions, such as pressure injury, the concept of 
unavoidability may be employed to limit access for high risk patients.  
 
 Additional examination of the pressure injury exemplar, provides evidence of marginalisation 
of particular patient groups due to perceptions of risk.  In the field of pressure injury, the 
current strategies for skin assessment (for example) are largely premised on the assumption 
of whiteness, and so the needs of persons from Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) 
communities are not well served by current assessment measures (Oozageer Gunowa, et al,, 
in press. In the US, analysing inpatient outcomes over a two year period, Duchman et al., 
(2016) reported that patient demographics such as black race, age and female gender 
predicted hospital acquired conditions (including pressure injury) following total joint 
arthroplasty. The historical failure in the pressure injury discourses to examine and 
acknowledge this risk, represents unavoidability as marginalisation. Further highlighting the 
complexity of notions of pressure injury avoidably, Sullivan (2012) argues that in the spinal 
unit, these injuries are given a moral dimension.  Pressure areas are seen as a type of 'self-
neglect' by patients rather than a 'body-neglect' by clinicians.  The implication being "that the 
individual who has the pressure sore feels sorry for her/himself; that s/he is just plain lazy, 
incompetent, a no-hoper, wants attention, can't hack it, is giving up" (Sullivan, 2012 p.38).   
 
Conclusion 
Our analysis illuminates how the concept of safety has evolved into two incommensurable 
fields. A mechanistic and rational concept of safety that foregrounds aspects of risk and harm 
that fits within biomedical confines and is amenable to technical intervention. And a richer 
contextualised concept, which foregrounds patient concerns, justice and moral and political 
imperatives.  Feenberg (1992) notes that in the wake of the scientific and technical 
revolution, no persuasive way has been found to unite the two worldviews of rationality and 
experience.  This is more than a theoretical concern. As the case of the dominant orthodoxy 
 in healthcare safety illustrates, patient experience is disconnected from the technical advance 
of defining what has been deemed unavoidable harm. 
 
Marcuse (1982), Heidegger (1977), Foucault (Burchell, Gordon, & Miller, 1991) and 
Bourdieu (1977) have each theorised the way in which individuals in modern society have 
“become little more than objects of technique” (Feenberg, 1992 p, 3). According to these 
scholars, technical rationality is pervasive, generating apparatus and dominative rationality 
(Marcuse, 1982).  The persuasive language and technologies of patient safety, risk reduction 
and incident prevention has enmeshed nursing in its strategic ambition.  Rarely foregrounded 
in the technical rationality of safety discourses, is the view that risk is not an objective, 
impartial or value-free concept (Jackson et al., 2016). Our conclusion is that, the concept of 
risk and unavoidable harm cannot exclude moral ideas and politics from its calculations 
(Douglas, 2013).  For nursing, the pervasive nature of this technical rationality risks 
privileging administrative priorities and decentring the moral imperatives of nursing care 
from the patient safety agenda.  
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